Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe
Volume 6

Issue 2

Article 2

4-1986

Religious Liberty in Yugoslavia: A Study in Ambiguity
Paul Mojzes
Rosemont University, Rosemont, PA

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree
Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Eastern European Studies Commons

Recommended Citation
Mojzes, Paul (1986) "Religious Liberty in Yugoslavia: A Study in Ambiguity," Occasional Papers on Religion
in Eastern Europe: Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/ree/vol6/iss2/2

This Article, Exploration, or Report is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN YUGOSLAVIA:
A STUDY IN AMBIGUITY
Paul

Mojzes

L The Heritage ofIntolerance
Balkan fractionalism, separatism, and intolerance are proverbial. Balkaniza
tion is neither recent nor finished. Some of the rivalries are "home made"; others
were unwelcome imports by invaders which found fertile ground to fester vigor
ously because of the proximity of diverse peoples clamoring for identity and
recognition.

The southern Slavic tribes settled on what is now the territory of Yugoslavia

in about the seventh century

c.E.

Francis Dvornik's remark, "The early history

of the Slavic nations is full of tragic incidents, of brilliant hopes, and promising
possibilities which seldom found realization owing to the various circumstances
and events beyond the control of the Slavic rulers,"1 certainly applies to the
southern Slavic people even to the most recent times. Religion, which was to
play a m ultifaceted role in the history of the area, became a tool of separation
practically from the outset of the conversion from the old Slavic religion to
Christianity. The eastern and southern regions of what is now Yugoslavia came
under the influence of the Byzantine Empire, which impressed upon its sphere
of influence the Eastern Orthodox form of Christianity. The western South
Slavic lands came under the impact of neighboring Rome, from which it inher

ited the rivai Roman Catholic brand of Christianity. Both Rome and Constanti
nople aspired to the extention of their variant to the entire area; thus, the two
forms of Christianity came into sharp conflict with each other, fostering fierce

loyalties in_ the local population, each developing the mentality of "final outpost

of the true faith in face of schismatic threat," which persists until today. The

developme�t of the Bosnian form of Christianity in the central regions, believed

to be the Bogumil heresy by both the Orthodox and the Catholics, further com

plicated this initial state of rivalry .2

The fourteenth-century conquest of most of the territory by Ottoman Turks
introduced another deadly religious conflict, namely, between an expanding
Islam and a defensive Christianity. Islam, the religion not only of the conquering

new settlers but also of many converts primarily from the ranks of the by-then
defunct Bosnian Church, reinforced the frontier-outpost mentality. Religion was
a precious form of identification at times when politics were determined by

1Francis Dvornik, The Slavs in European History and CTvflizatfon (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutgers University Press, 1962), p. 2.
2John V. A. Fine, Jr., The Bomian Church: A New Interpretation (Boulder, CO: East
European Quarterly, 1975).
·

·
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more powerful neighbors and where increasingly the clergy' especially among the.
conquered people, played the leadership role in the absence of other native gov
erning authorities. The Turkish milet system-which divided people not so much
into teiTitorial units but into religious con,ununities, granting a certain autonomy
and responsibility to their religious leaders-tended to rigidify the traditional
European identification of an ethnic group with a single religion. The religious
leaders exhibited patriotism even in cases where the center of a religion, as in
the case of Catholicism, was outside the country or where the rulers, like the
Austrians and Hungarians, were likewise Catholic. Th�s, the churches became
the staunch supporters of the survival of a threatened identity of their member
ship, and religious affiliation became permanently welded to national conscious
miss. To this day, this ethnoreligious unity presents a strength, a challenge, or a
problem, depending on the perspective of the viewer.
Then Protestants came onto the scene, further complicating the rivalries.
The Reformation was moderately successful in Slovenia and Croatia, only to be
nearly wiped out by the Counter-Reformation. In the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries some of the newer Protestant denominations made their appearance,
but they, too, added to the combative mood of intolerance. The larger group of
Protestants were the folk churches of such national minorities as the Hungarians,
Slovaks, or Germans. The free churches generally pursued a policy of proselytiz
ing the more inert members of the other churches, which, of necessity, led to
sharp conflicts.
With the formation of Yugoslavia at the end of World War I, the conflicts
and intolerance persisted, changing only the group in power. Now Islam was in
retreat, with Orthodox and Catholics receiving legal privileges as the established
religions of their respective areas, each aspiring to a final vindication of its reviv
al, hoping to absorb within its fold more or less the entire population. The ethnic
rivalries of the two most numerous populations, namely, the Orthodox Serbs
and Catholic Croats, culminated during World War II in a fratricidal civil war in
which-many old scores were settled by massacres and in which forcible conver
sions were attempted. Total bedlam prevailed.
The last to arrive on the scene was the "religion," or pseudoreligion, of
Communism, originally in a Leninistic-Stalinistic totalitarian garb. This drove the
most recent wedge into an already hopelessly fragmented population. The Com
munists did not side with any of the existing religions but had quarrels with all
of them. They, too, aspired to eliminate all rivals. Nurtured on an intolerant soil,
driven by an intolerant secular faith, and guided by an example of the militantly
atheistic Soviet Union, the Yugoslav Communists were going to heal the rifts of
disunity by bringing the entire country to reconciliation through the process of
building socialism. Th.is, too, made demands upon the body and the soul, with
the ultimate result of bringing one more divisive loyalty into the region. Plural
ism is the name; intolerance, the game!
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IL Communist Policies toward Religion

The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was originally a loyal follower of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and shared all its ideals and approaches.
Two well-known Leninistic principles dominated this approach. One was the
legal separation of church and state, declaring religion the private affair of every
citizen. This had the effect of relegating religion out of the public sphere into
the private spiritual domain of individuals. Religious liberty was understood
narrowly as the freedom to worship or not to worship. The second principle was
that it is the task of the Marxist party as the vanguard of the working classes to
assist in what it considered the inevitable fading away of religion, thus assisting
the process of individual and social liberation from superstitious and exploitative
religious practices which are surviving merely as vestiges of the past.
In theory these two principles can be separated by stating that the govern
ment applies the first principle, while the Communist Party advocates the second.
That theoretical distinction is a vain one, however, for in practice the govern
ment consists of the leaders of the Communist Party, and the second principle
becomes decisive in interpreting the first. This conflict of approaches still colors
the present situation despite some efforts to modify it by emphasizing legal
aspects of the principles of separation of church and state which would tend
to diminish state intervention in religious matters, thereby providing for greater
religious liberty.
Several discernible stages mark this period from the Communist takeover in
1944/45 to the present. 3 These are presented here very concisely,4 because a
knowledge of them is necessary to understand the evolution of the theory and
practice to the present moment-while the focus of this presentation is on the
current status of religious liberties.
The first period was from 1945 to 1953, when the government and the
party mounted an all-out attack on the churches despite a claim of religious
liberty. Marxist scholars and even the government leaders admitted in the l 960's
and 1970's that harsh measures were undertaken against religious institutions
and individuals, including imprisonment, murder, the nationalization and de
struction of property, and so forth.
From 1953 to 1965, the second period, there was a gradual reduction of the
pressure against churches and religious individuals, though excesses-such as tor
ture, imprisonment on false charges, and even murder by the secret police were
still practiced from time to time, more in some parts of the country than in

3For a detailed description of church-state relations from 1945 to 1972, see Stella
Alexander, Church and State in Yugoslavia since 1945 (London, New York, Melbourne:
Cambridge University Press, 1979).
4A more elaborate discussion of this is found in Paul Mojzes, "Christian-Marxist Dia
logue in the Context of a Socialist Society," Journal of E cumenical Studies 9 (Winter,
·

1972): 4-25.

··
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others. Kegiona1 differences in the treatment of religion became even more pro

nounced, a feature which to this day characterizes Yugoslav church-state rela
tions and which have increasingly been handled by the republican and provincial

rather than the federal government. What this means at present in practice is that

in one region of the country, for example, in Slovenia and Croatia, the authori
ties may show a great deal more tolerance and permissiveness toward religious
activities, while in another part, for example, in Macedonia or Kosovo, clergy
and believers are openly harassed and intimidated by the police, and very few
public pronouncements of the greater liberties in the other parts of the country
reach the local public.
The third period, from

1965

to

197 1,

was the most liberal period in the

. treatment of the churches. Some call it the "golden age" in church-state rela
tions. The system had opened up to such a degree that many religious practices
were unobstructed. Government interference in internal church matters was min
imalized and in some instances was almost completely removed. The churches
were permitted to publish journals and books again; theological schools were

allowed to expand; clergy could travel freely in and out of the country; religious

education on church premises was sanctioned again; etc. A growing concern,
however, was expressed by the government and the press at the simultaneous
increase of politicization of the few larger religions, particularly the Roman
Catholic, but also the Islamic and Serbian Orthodox. The chauvinistic nationalist
excesses (demonstrations, riots, and terrorist actions) frightened Tito and the
other leaders to the point that they feared that the country and/or the social
system might collapse. They then undertook measures not only to purge the
Communist Party from "anarcholiberals" and "nationalists" but to tighten the
reins on religion as well.
This led to the fourth period, from

1972

to

1983, which was characterized

by an attempt to install more controls over church life and the suspension or
privatization of the Christian-Marxist dialogue which had commenced during the
previous period. A complete reversal of the concessions made during the previous
period did not take place, however. Certain aspects of church life did not suffer
at all but, rather, continued steadily, thereby giving additional weight to certain
freedoms (for example, noninterference in the curricula and teaching staff of
theological schools and fairly easily obtained permissions for repairs of church
buildings). In a few areas no progress was made (for example, no access to radio
or television), while in others there was some regress (for example, longer periods
of prior notification of authorities required if a foreign visitor was to preach in
a church). The situation altered not qualitatively but quantitatively. A certain
increase of confrontational practices could be felt.
After

1983

there seems to have been an onset of a new period,5 although

SOther attempts at periodization have been made by other scholars. See, e.g., Zdenko
Roter, "Razvoj odnosov med katoliSko cerkvijo in deriavo v socijalisticni Jugoslavijii,"
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there is a lack of clarity both as to whether that is the case and as to what direc�
·

tion the trend has taken. This lack of clarity corresponds to the confusion after
Tito's death, not only with respect to national leadership and the direction of

the beleaguered economy but also in the general feeling that the country is in

a crisis. National conflicts seem to have increased, leading to the brink of open

conflict (in which the churches are implicated and which they do not consciously
seek to diminish). However, a new openness has been experienced-at least with

regard to the freedom to discuss in the press and other media and at conferences
-certain formerly taboo subjects pertaining to earlier and present failures of the
leadership. This new period seems to contain not only possible pitfalls (especially
seeking to divert the national focus on economic problems by attacking the
churches as scapegoats) but also new opportunities for the expansion of liberties
in a country which is without a long democratic tradition.
By and large, the general trend during these successive stages was toward an
increase in the autonomy and liberty of religion, though oscillations were evident

both in place and within the time periods. The government of Yugoslavia con·
sciously attempted to create a system, usually called workers' self-management,

which would be more open and tolerant than the Soviet model. They accepted

as a reality that religion would not vanish as rapidly as they had originally ex
pected and that, therefore, some accommodations must be made since religion
exerts a considerable influence over large segments of the population. The in·
creased participation in religious practices was interpreted by them as either a

larger number of people "coming out of the closet" when the repressions eased,
or as a genuine religious revival, particularly among the young. This necessitated

at least a reassessment of the role of religion in the particular circumstances of
Yugoslav history and for many Marxists an advocacy of more tolerant attitudes

toward religion, as long as religious people spearheaded no open revolt against

the government. The basic concession asked from the churches was not to

oppose the socialist system but rather to recognize it at least tacitly. The slogan
changed from "if you are not with us you are against us" to "if you are not
against us you are with us." This called for a less doctrinaire approach to religion,
which is today's hallmark of the Yugoslav government's attitude toward religion.

III Recent Legislation concerning Religion
This section should be prefaced with some preliminary remarks regarding
the Communist understanding of government and law. Theoretically, their under
standing of the role of the government and the law is that they protect the in·
terest of the ruling class. Whenever the perception of that interest changes, as

Teorija in praksa 7 (September, 1970): i280-1282; and Pedro Ramet, "Catholicism and
Politics in Socialist Yugoslavia," Religion in Communist Lands 10 (Winter, 1982): 257 .
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reality changes. , there may be swift changes in the government form and person

nel as well as in the law. There is no judicial or legislative independence from the

executive branch, which consists entirely of Communist leaders. The text of the
law, and even more so its application, can be bent in any direction if this is in
their interest. Hence, it is highly deceptive to point to the text of the law and
regard it as normative for actual practices. The letter of the law may proclaim a

variety of freedoms, but it is the executive branch which interprets and guides its

application. The judicial branch will carry out the decisions which the executive

branch makes, no matter how much bending of the law that may require. Many

observers of the Communist countries have noticed that one of the greatest

objective weaknesses of the Marxist form of governance is the problem of "social·
ist legality:" Since it is solely the party leadership which determines what is in
the interest of the "working people," there is really little protection of human

rights unless that happens to be interpreted as being of benefit to those in power.

The meaning of many human rights is bent out of shape by spurious "double
talk."
This is not to say that what the laws say is totally unimportant. If the laws
clearly guarantee certain rights or prohibit certain actions, rather than being
vague or secretive, there will then be some pressure which can be exerted, at
least in principle, to get the government minimally to observe the very laws
which it created. In Yugoslavia, then, laws are not unimportant, though they are
not decisive in the exercise of religious libe.rties.

The several post-World War II constitutions

(1946, 1956, 1963,

and

1974)

affirm the basic freedom of religion and conscience, separation of church and
state (including separation of schools from the churches), equal status for all
religious institutions and individuals before the law, and the prohibition of the
use of religion to incite national hatred and intolerance or to abuse religion for
political purposes. 6 Article

174

of the constitution of

1974

maintains that the

practice of �eligion is an individual affair, so that no one may be forced to join
or be preyented from joining a church, and it recognizes religious communities
as legal persons which are free to conduct worship serviCes, rites, and religious
affairs (the latter was left undefined). The government may provide financial
support for specific purposes. Religious communities may own properties within
the limit of the law. While the constitution gives the appearance of guaranteeing
freedom of religion without any consequences for the citizens' status, this is

neither clearly spelled out in theory, nor carried out in practice, for it is quite
impossible for an explicitly religious person to attain higher ranks in government,
education, the army, or economic management.7 The constitution guarantees
•
.
6Mosf orth-e inforrnatfon on legislatfon regarding relliion is from Ivan Lazic, "Pravni i
cinjenicni polozaj konfesionalnih zajednica u Jugoslaviji," in Zlatko Frid, ed., Vjerske
zajednice u Jugoslaviji (Zagreb: NIP "Binoza," 1970), pp. 45-77 ; and Stella Alexander,
"Yugoslavia: New Legislation on the Legal Status of Re_ligious Communities," Religion in
Communist Lands 8 (Summer, 1980): 119-124.
7fhere was even some discussion as to whether-the selector and coach of the· national
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people

·
have nearly always experienced

"second class citizen" treatment. The right to participate in public life is denied

to the religious cpmmunities, and de facto individual believers also are limited in
their participation in public life, particularly in major decisions.
In 1953 the first special legislation on religion was promulgated, called "The
Basic Law of the Legal Position of Religious Communities." In it the federal
government expanded the constitutional regulations, specifying the rights and
obligations of the confessional groups as well as rights and responsibilities of
government organs dealing with religion. These laws became well known to the
religious communities and gave a modicum of stability to church-state relations
because they at least made clear what the norms were upon which the govern
ment insisted.
The second attempt to provide the legal framework for the developing
church-state relations was different from the first in that the regulations were
not on the federal but the state (republican and provincial) level. This not only
reflected the decentralization of power in the government which had taken place,
but it also made it possible for the different religious situations in particular
states to be treated in a more diversified way. The laws were submitted to public
discussion in 1975 and 1976 and have been enacted subsequently (mostly in
1978).
This newest comprehensive legislation guarantees that the religious commu
nities may publish, and it sets the conditions for these publications-with minor
variants among the states. Clergy are allowed to visit their members in hospitals
and homes for the elderly, but not in prisons or in the army. Social and econom
ic activities are forbidden to the religious communities, which tends to stop all
charitable activities (which were occasionally permitted in the past), as well as
any recreational and educational activities for children and youth which are not
strictly tied to some religious observance. Religious education for the ministry
and of children are permitted. Theoretically, a child under fourteen (in Mace
donia under ten} may be compelled to participate in religious education if the
parents insist, but generally the consent of both parents and the child are re
quired. In actuality, serious pressures are brought to bear upon children and
believers not to take part in such religious education. This is mostly accom-·
plished in schools or at parents' place of employment, making it nearly impos
sible for members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (the Communist
Party's altered name since the l 960's) to resist.

All places of worship and church real estate must be registered with the
government, as must all religious communities. No special permission is needed
for activities within church buildings, but for any out-of-door activities permits
must be sought, and such permits have often been denied. There is a ban on

�opics

of a political nature at religious gatherings. No pressures may be exerted

basketball team could be a former star who had become � Mormon during his stay in the
U . S . A.
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on peopie to participate in any religious activities. Fines and some imprisonment

have been imposed for violating these laws. While there is a feeling that some of
these laws are more restrictive than the ones of 1953, there is also a feeling that

one may appeal for redress against violations of these laws, though in practice

religious communities have rarely, if ever, sought to prosecute a government

official who may have mistreated them. One of the most dramatic cases o� a
confrontation between a church and an official whom the church felt to be a
threat was the 1985 statement by the Serbian Orthodox Church that a high

official of the Commission for .Religious Affairs of Serbia, Radovan Samardzic,

was persona non grata because of comments he allegedly made,. which the Ser
bian Orthodox Church considered inimical to its interests.

IV. Reports ofMistreatment and A buse
Even good laws are of no avail if they are not conscientiously applied. Yugo
slav laws on religious communities are still somewhat restrictive, but they may
well be one of the best sets of laws of any Eastern European socialist country.
The larger question is whether there are not abuses of authority in the imple
mentation or nonapplication of laws, resulting in the mistreatment of individuals
and intimidation of communities. There is considerable arbitr�riness in the appli
cation of the laws by local officials, which is condoned by the higher aut.'-1orities.
There is little effective control exercised by the higher over the local officials.
The rule of thumb is that the one with the less tolerant attitude toward religion
will prevail in determining the actual government position toward the local
churches. Those who are more tolerant are generally more timid in asserting
their views. In regions where the conflicts between church and state are greater,
the abuses tend to be greater. Abuses also tend to be greater where more authori
tarian or doctrinaire officials are in power. For instance, with the fall of Alexan
der Rankovic in 1965 from the vice-presidency _of the country, his hold on the

organs of internal security (U. D. B. A.-the secret police) was broken, and a period
of relaxation ensued not only for the churches but also for life in general. Thus,

the orientation of a key leader or local official can determine to what degree
human rights are respected.
The evidence shows that the greatest conflict exists between the government
and the Roman Catholic Church, which was reflected by the many more arrests

and trials of Catholic clergy than of other church officials. The following is a list
of arrests and other repressive acts reported by AKSA, the Catholic News Service
from Zagreb,8 from October, 1982, to September, 1985:

1: The three-and-a-half-year sentence of friar Joze Zovko of Medjugorje,

'As report ed in AKSA Bulletin, an English translation made by Stella Alexander and
Muriel Heppel, and distribu_ted by Kesten College in England, hereafter abbreviated as AB.
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who was accused of inventing and orchestrating the apparitions of the -Virgin to

several teenagers, which brought about mass pilgrimages from home and abroad,
was reduced to one-and-a-half years by an appeals court.9

2.

•

Only a section of a mosaic in the church at Straieman containing the

likeness of the late Alojzije Cardinal Stepinac (rather than the entire mosaic) will
be removed.10

3 . Zeljko Slonjsak, a parish priest at Kutina, has been sentenced to three

years of imprisonment for spreading false information in a collection of sermons,
"Flora of Vinogorsko," that he edited-which was a crime according to Article

187 of the Croatian Criminal Code.11

4.

Marija Car from Duga Resa was expelled from the League of Communists

because her husband, a nonparty-member, had christened their child. Her expul
sion was sustained despite her appeal.12

5. A representative on the Water and Sewage Board in Split was called upon

by her youth organization to give an account of her interest in religion.13

6. The municipal counci
_ l in Split prohibited the completion of work on,

and usage of finished sections of, the Church of St. Peter in Split. Frane Cardinal
Franic protested that the church did nothing illegal.14

7. The Veterans' Association of Gornje Cemiljev disassociated itself from

verbal offenses in an argument over building a local church. Apparently this was

not the first time where the bigotry of state officials has been moderated by the
Veterans' Association.15

8. The priest of the Holy Cross Church at Siget (Zagreb), Fr. Emmanuel

Hosko, issued denials against the accusation that he organized disco dances and

sporting events for the youth, apart from spontaneous singing and play after

religious instruction.16

9. Ivan Lalic, head of the Commission for Religious Affairs of Croatia, cited

examples where Catholics carried Croatian flags without the red star and sang
old Croatian patriotic (nationalistic) songs at religious gatherings. Such events

are not uniformly punished; in Split such infractions draw fines of fifteen to

thirty days' imprisonment, while an Orthodox priest and a teacher in Bosnia
Herzegovina were sentenced to five years' imprisonment for singing

Chetnik

songs.17

10. Andjelka Jagnic was imprisoned fifteen days for claiming to have seen

a vision of the Virgin in Gala. A journalist of

Slobodna Dalmacija criticized

authorities for the absence of legal grounds for such a sentence. He quipped,
"Would Andjelka Jagnic have been sentenced to a month's imprisonment if she
8

had seen her wit11 the child Jesus in her arms? "1

9AB, October 21, 1982, p. 8.
'0Ibid.
"AB, December 17, 1982, p. 9.
12AB, August 5, 1983, p. 9.
13Ibid.

14AB, September 12, 1983, p. 4.
15AB, November 22, 1983, p. 8.
16AB, December, 1983, p. 3.
'"'Ibid.
18AB, February 2 1,. 1984, p. 10.

1 i. Great controversy was caused by a statement attributed to Bishop Zazin
ovic of Krk at the Eucharistic Congress in which he allegedly said that godless
materialism must be fought by all honorable means, including the shedding of

blood. 1he secular press accused him of favoring inquisitional methods; he

defended himself by saying that he criticized not materialists but materialism

and that the shedding of blood was a reference to Christians' willingness to shed
their own blood. He also complained that attempts had been made to discourage
believers from attending the Eucharistic Congress.19

12. lvica Masturko, a Marxist scholar, criticized militant atheization. He
pointed out that the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia,
which is supposed to gather people irrespective of their beliefs, is almost com
pletely dominated by Communists and that such monopoly runs counter to self
0
management. 2

13. Prof. Joze Krasovec of the Theological School in Ljubljana was sentenced
to a month's imprisonment for the following passage in his book Christians for

the Future:
Militant atheists and the champions of man's functional role in a col

lective are particularly aware of how powerful and efficient is the
religious faith of a community. Hence they deceive the people with

slogans saying that religion is a purely private, individual affair. They
know that a man must be isolated; then he will become their submis
sive subject, an element in their system.

The prosecutor maintained that such a passage incites bad feelings among citi
zens, while Krafovec defended himself by saying that the passage had been taken
out of context.21

14. Bishop Kos of Djakovo complained about the Commissions for Relations
. with Religious Communities of Vojvodina and Sremska Mitrovica because, during
the celebration of the elevation of the parish church in Sremska Mitrovica to a
pro-cathedral, they banned a procession of clergy into the church and withdrew
- --transportation facilities to pilgrims just before the onset of festivities. He com
plained that these acts were illegal.22

15.

At a meeting of the secretaries of the Communist organizations of Slo

venia several prominent members of the Central Committee admitted that there
were still cases of discrimination against believers but that these were cases of

arbitrariness which harm both believers and unbelievers. Militant atheism is being
superseded by a more moderate revolutionary view.23

16. The Coordinating Council of the Regional Committees for Relations with
Religious Communities of Serbia sharply attacked the Serbian Orthodox religious
press for taking a pastoral attitude toward Serbs outside of Serbia, thereby incit-

19AB, March 29, 1984, pp. 8-9.
2°Ibid., p. 14.
21AB, May 10, 1984, p. 6.

22AB, July 6, 1984, p. 5.
23Ibid., p. 7.

raui Mo3zes

33

ing national and religious intolerance. The writings of Prof. Atanasije Jeftic were

singled out, stating that "it was unacceptable that a theologian and trainer of

students at the theological faculty should treat questions unconnected with the
church."24

17.

Reporting on the meeting of the Holy Synod of the Serbian Orthodox

Church, Pravoslav/je stated Hiat permission to build churches where they were

destroyed in World War II had still not been obtained in many places, while

church property, including court yards and grave yards, had been seized illegally,

pupils harrassed by school authorities, they and their parents pressured not to go

to church or celebrate holy days, and "attempts are even made to force them to

eat forbidden foods on fast days. "25

18. The inconsistencies of application of the law which was noted by Pravo
slavlje were also contained in a letter to the editor of Svijet by the Orthodox

priest Zeljko Gavrilovic, who wrote, "One could write a book about the sec

tarian attitudes toward religion on the part of members of the LCY in different
" 6
areas. 2

19. The Archbishop of Ljubljana, Dr. Alojzije Sustar, stated thatthere are

still many historical distortions and attacks on the church, although there has

been a marked improvement with respect to obtaining permission to build new

churches, visit the old and the sick, print new brochures, and obtain social secur
ity and health· insurance for clergy. However, he stated that church members

often complain that the "good relations" between church and state, which the

government declares, "are just empty words, because of unfortunate personal
experiences."27

20. The Franciscan friar Vlado Buntic, assistant pastor at Drinovici, had been

at that point imprisoned for two months on a summary conviction, without trial;
no written copy of the sentence was sent to the parish office.28

21. The building of a cemetery chapel at Cerci was halted by a building

--

inspector, although a permit to build had been received. TI1e local Communists

-complained that the cross of the chapel would be too high and that a road and a
House of Culture should be finished first.29

22. At a series of seminars for Communists in Dalmatia, it was reported that

"hostile, malevolent or sectarian attitudes towards believers still exist and that

divisions between people based on their world-views are still prevalent: intoler
ance towards believers has become a sort of religious attitude."30

23. Armin Prebeg, a priest from Split, was sentenced to fifty days in prison

for allegedly forcing a woman in a hospital to go to confession.31

24. The secretary of the Central Committee of the League of Communists in

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Ivan Cvitkovic, otherwise a sociologist of religion,

24Ibid., p. 8.
25AB, August 23, 1984, pp. 7-8.
26Ibid., p. 8.
27AB, October 11, 1984, p. 4.

28Ibid ., p. :s.
29Ibid., p. 8.
30AB, November 16, 1984, p. 5.
31AB, June 20, 1985; p. 7.
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stated in

a

lecture that there are conflicts of conscience for believers, such as·

a Catholic physician who must perform abortions in the hospital although his
beliefs forbid him, or a Muslim serving in the army who is not able to eat every
thing since no provisions are made for religious dietary regulations.32

25. TI1e Franciscan friar Emmanuel Juric from Tuzla was imprisoned for

forty days for "insulting the patriotic feelings of citizens" in a confession.33

26. The Macedonian Veterans' Association warned that the spread of reli

gious education in Macedonia is harmful, particularly among Albanian Muslims
who send their children to medressas rather than public schools.34

27. Several high government officials blamed the Catholic Church for violat

ing the principles of the Protocol between the Vatican and Yugoslavia, saying

that a section of the Catholic clergy is misusing their rights for "nationalist, anti
socialist, and anti-Yugoslav ends."35 (These oft-repeated charges of clericalism

are leveled mostly at Catholic, but also at Serbian [not Macedonian, however]
Orthodox and Muslim, religious leaders.)

28. Franjo Cardinal Kuharic of Zagreb criticized the attempts to suppress

religion and deny religious liberties and rights.36

29. A member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was sentenced to two

and-a-half years in prison for refusing to bear anns. 37

. 30. Religious activities are increasingly described as nationalist or clerona

tionalist, according to both Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic Croatian
sources.38

These ample illustrations are not exhaustive, nor are they a particularly

investigated account of violations of religious rights, but primarily the ones that

have been reported in the secular or religious press. Many violations are not
reported by the victims (analogous to rape victims) for fear of making their

situations worse. I personally know the case of a young man who, while serving

in the army, confided after several months to a "friend" that he was a Seventh
day Adventist. He was immediately reprimanded by his commanding officers,
sent for psychiatric observation, and later dismissed from the army without any
indication of what further steps might be taken against him. He and his sister,
a student, both shared their impression that it is best not to admit to anyone
that one is a believer because there a·re unpleasant consequences for one's educa
tion or career or one's parents' careers.
The Yugoslav police, security organs, and prison guards are known for their

32lbid., p. 8.
33AB, July 25, 1985, p. 4. A somewhat different account is given on p. 6, where a Fran
ciscan priest, Branko Jurit, was reportedly sentenced to fourteen days for saying in the
confessional that, if his penitents were swearing at God, why not swear at Tito and the state.
><Ibid., p. 5.
35lbid., p. 6 .
. 36lbid., p. 7.
3'AB, August 16, 1985, p. 7.
38lbid., pp. 5 and 6.
.
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brutal methods of investigation and treatment of those who are arrested. f rom
conversation with a man who was imprisoned only several years ago, I learned
that during preliminary hearings he was tied to a radiator, and two masked

policemen beat him repeatedly with rubber truncheons until he was ready to

"admit." After serving two years in prison, he wet his bed every night for a long
time. Although a large, strong man, he admitted crying like a child and begging

for mercy when he was beaten.

The case of a young worker who attended some Marxist "dissident" meet·

ings, was interrogated in 1983 by the police, and was later found dead has
become well known in the West. The police claimed he committed suicide, but
it obviously was a case of police-murder.

It is not suggested that these two illustrations of police methods were specif

ically against believers. The last such case of police-murder known to me was of

a Methodist minister from Macedonia, Asen Palankov, in 1958.39 If they are will
ing to use harsh methods against some, they certainly are able to use it against
others, including religious offenders. This is not merely

a

logical inference but is

empirically confirmed. For instance, other Methodist clergy in Macedonia have

been threatened by the police that their "guts ·will hang from the rafters just
as Palankov's did." The clergy are often summoned by the police for "friendly
discussion" sessions which are secretly tape-recorded. At suoh sessions they are

requested to submit membership lists and asked about their own and their mem

bers' political views; requests for church repairs are denied for decades, and
church members' legal appeals are consistently denied. This results in a general

feeling of helplessness and resignation, since they know that their rights have

much less chance of being defended than those of persons who are not religious.

It also brings divisiveness into the ranks of church leaders and laity as to how

one should respond to such pressures. Generally, those who are more intimi·

dated or conciliatory tend to gain an upper hand and set a tone of timidity and

compromise. This, in turn, often alienates younger people who have not been
directly exposed to such harsh treatment.

V. On the Brighter Side
Nevertheless, enormous progress has been made in the degree of openness

and freedom for religion in the past twenty years. There seem to be no current

prisoners for purely religious cases, and the length of imprisonment for the
mixed religiopolitical cases is shorter than in the past.

The sociological studies of religion have become scholarly in nature and have

not only discovered inaccuracies in the traditional Marxist notions of religion but

39Paul Mojzes, "A History of the Congregational and Methodist Churches in Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia" (unpublished doctoral dissertation at Boston University, 1965), p. 598.
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have also admitted the very significant explicit or latent religiosity of the major·
ity of Yugoslavs. Among these sociologists, the vast number (to mention the
most prC1minent ones, Esad Cimic, Zdenko Roter, Marko Kedevan, Srdjan
Vrcan, Steflca Bahtijarevic, Ivan Cvitkovic, Ivica Ma�turko, Nikola Dugandtija,
and the philosophers Branko Bofajak and Andrija Kre�ic) have pressed for a
genuine separation of church and state where the state would not be an advocate
and promoter of anti-theism but a truly a-theist state which would favor neither
nonbelievers nor believers. Their influence, while not determinative, is signifi
cant. The Yugoslav Communists are not at all like-minded on how to deal with
religion, and a considerable struggle is taking place in which the moderates seem
to be gaining in influence. Should they prevail, religious liberty would be guaran
teed more effectively.
In the decade from 1970 to 1980, five times as many religious as Marxist
publications (with a circulation of 15,580,000 against 3,478,000) were reported
by the theoretical party journal Komunist.40 While there is no complete freedom
of publication, it is astonishing for someone who has known how restrictive that
policy used to be in Yugoslavia, and still is in the rest of Eastern Europe, to see
how wide the scope of research, writing, translating, and publishing is in Yugo
slavia with respect to books, journals, and newspapers. Material critical of the
government and even of the system have been published. The religious press is
not among the more outspoken critics, but it has definitely benefited from the
enlarged scope of the freedom of the press. There seem to be few if any restric
tions in the number of copies, size, or nature of publications, though the reli
gious press is not supposed to treat solely political or social issues. Yet, criticism

of government social policies did appear in the religious press (for example, anti
abortion statements in the Catholic press). The Bible, Qur'an, Talmud, and other
scriptures ltave been newly translated, published in Yugoslavia, or imported from
abroad and have been disseminated not only through the churches-many book
stores also carry them as standard items. In some parts of the country there is no
- - shortage of scriptures, but in other parts the demand still outstrips the supply.
While the secular press frequently takes pot-shots at religion, such attacks
are by no means universal. Often journalists or even government officials will
treat religion positively and will advocate more moderate policies. Sometimes,
but not always, letters to editors critical of the paper or of some government
policy will be printed. Many feel that the cooperation of believers and nonbeliev
ers is much more desirable than conflict. From time to time, in specific cases,
the journalist will take the side of a religious group over against an official's or
court's action.
Pilgrimages to Rome, Jerusalem, Mecca, Padua, as well as sites in Yugoslavia,
such as Marija Bistrica, Medjugorje, and the medieval Serbian monasteries, take
place in large numbers with the assistance of travel and transportation agencies.

40AB, November, 1984, p. 5.
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Masses and services in native and foreign languages are provided for tourists and
locals and announced in prominent places (the authorities even permitted the
celebration of a Mass at an international nudist assembly, though it did provoke

considerable discussion in the church as to whether the officiating priest should

be nude-that is really on the bright side!).
Travel abroad by all, including clergy, and visits by foreign religious leaders
have not been impeded since about the late 1960's. Such visitors as the Moscow
Patriarch, the Vatican Secretary of State, or other prelates and dignitaries (for
example, Billy Graham) are allowed to preach and to visit with their peers, and
they are received by government officials. Even more encouraging are visits and
public lectures by such notable theologians as Hans Kung and Jurgen Moltmann.
Each year there is an international seminar on the future of religion which takes
place at the Inter-university Center for Post-graduate Studies in Dubrovnik.
International learned societies discussing the theme of religion have met in Yugo
slavia with no interference, and foreign missionaries or professors have been
allowed to preach or teach in Yugoslavia.
The youth have shown considerable interest in religion and considerably less
interest in state-supported atheism. The weekly NIN asked, "Who attracts young
people? Two thousand people attended a talk on religion and mysticism in the
Youth Centre and five hundred people stood and listened for hours to a discus
sion on religion in the Student Centre."41 And this took place in Serbia, where
the interest in religion is not as visible as in Croatia. At the 1984 Eucharistic
Congress at Marija Bistrica,42 the majority seem to have been young, and many
walked fifty miles or more to the Congress singing Christian songs.
Christian-Marxist dialogues have taken place, both in public and in publica
tions, scholarly or otherwise.43 The scholarly dialogue does not seem to have a
direct impact on the relations between government leaders and higher clergy,
however. The negotiations between officials of church and state occur in a less
- . generous atmosphere, but the fruits of the dialogue do render the context of
negotiations more constructive.
After years of being denied permission, the Serbian Orthodox Church re
ceived the authorization to continue the construction of the Cathedral of St.
Sava in Belgrade, and the church at the site of the fonner concentration camp of
Jasenovac has been finished, while the Archbishopric of Split has been granted
the right to proceed with its cathedral church. After the earthquake of Skopje

all faiths were allocated ground for building churches or mosques according to
a carefully developed urbanization plan, and financial assistance from abroad for
such buildings has been allowed. In fact, the government has become aware of
the potential financial benefit of some religio.us activities, especially during the

41AB, May 10, 1983, p. 9.
42Christopher Cvlic, "An Outburst of Faith," The Ta.blet, October 6, 1984, pp. 964-966.
43Paul Mojzes. Christian-Marxist Dialogue in Eastern Europe (Minneapolis: Augsburi:
Publishing House, 1981), pp. 128-158.
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difficult economic crises, and it has tended to move pragmatically to share in the
benefits. Funds have been granted by the government for the repair and restora
tion of historical religious monuments.
No quota has been imposed on theological schools, so they are able to admit
as many students as there are applicants. On the whole, there seems to be a satis
factory number of clergy, though some churches, mainly for internal reasons,
experience greater problems in recruitment than others. The curricula of these
schools are entirely in the hands of the churches. Clergy are allowed to form
professional associations, which have been resented by certain hierarchies but de
fended by the governments as consistent with the social system. Social security
and health insurance have been made available to clergy. The churches are al
lowed to provide pastoral care for the immigrant communities of Yugoslavs
working abroad.
Thus, one can see that the rights exercised by religious communities in
Yugoslavia are not inconsiderable. As a rule, the list of permitted activities has
expanded steadily.

VI. The Ambivalence of the Present Situation
If one were to notice only the bright side, then Yugoslavia's record in reli
gious liberties would be exemplary and its future bright. However, if one were
to look only at the previously itemized instances of government repression, one
would conclude that the situation is bleak-certainly not as bleak as in Albania,
the Soviet Union, or Bulgaria, but, nevertheless, bleak. Many believers in Yugo
slavia as well as observers dwell at length on this aspect of the limitations of reli
gious liberties. For instance, Jure KriSto stated,
The relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Com
m unist regime in Yugoslavia is almost as bad now as in the inimedi
ate postwar period

( 1 945-1 953).

The Communist Party began its

relentless, organized attack on the Catholic Church in 1 97 1 through
the media and other channels; this onslaught peaked in 1 9 8 1 . Un
reasonable, escalated antireligious propaganda and im prison ment of
44
a num ber of priests took place.

Pedro Ramet observed the ambiguity as it applies to the Catholic Church in this
perceptive manner:
The Catholic Church certainly enjoys m ore freedom in Yugoslavia
than it does in any oth er Com m unis t country. But it has to fight to
.

win and maintain· that freedom, and there rem ain distinct limits to

·

"""Relations between the State and the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia, Yugoslavia in
the 197 0's and 1980's,"
Occasional Papers on Religion in Eastern Europe 2 (June, 1982):
.
22.
.
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what the Communist authorities will tolerate . . . . Thus the Church

remains a tolerated species, but one destined for extinction in the
ripeness of time . . . the Church finds itself being nudged to the

periphery of social and cultural life -to say nothing of its official
banishment from politics-to a niche in which it cannot be content .
. . . Its defe nse of human rights and of the national aspiration of the

Croats is part and parcel of that aspiration. But that aspiration . . . is

precisely the LCY's definition of the "m ortal sin" of cleri�alism.45

A Roman C atholic theologian from Zagreb , Vjekoslav Bajsic, described the

situation as being more or less the same since 1963 with some oscillations (fo r
example, improvement after the signing of the Protocol between Yugoslavia and
the Vatican) . When the relations b etween the great power blocs deteriorate, it

makes an impression on church-state relations, even in neutral Yugoslavia, be

cause there is less room fo r walking o n a tight-rope. The church more or less
does what it wants, but some individuals experience pressure-for instance, if
they send their children to religious education or if someone carelessly said
something tactless. It is not clear who instigates actions against the believers; it
is not always by instructions from above, but since the country is not monolithic
many people take the initiative in creating difficulties for believers. In Yugo
slavia it is difficult to say what the official line is and wh�t is only a press attack.
The inconsistencies are marke d . In Split nuns were prevented from providing
child day-care centers, while in Zagreb they continue to do so . In Slovenia
there is an association of Catholic j ournalists who have frequently criticized and
accused government officials for their attitude toward the church, while in
Croatia that cannot be done. In Croatia there are local obstructions to the build
ing of churches, while this is rtot the case in Slovenia . In early 1985 there were
sharp attacks upon the Roman Catholic Church , but at the great fe stival of Sts.
Cyril and Methodius in Djakovo in the summer of 1985 everything went well .
Likewise , the great Marian pilgrimage and Eucharistic C ongress in Marij a Bistrica,
the largest religious gathering ever in Yugoslavia (about 200,000 to 300,000
people), experienced no hitches.
In BajsiC's opinion the relationship between church and state will not sig
nificantly" change. There arc no particular trends, toward either reconciliation
or sharper attacks. The government does not want to see an increased role for
the churches and realizes that if religion does not organize itself it will not be
dangerous. Thus, the great issue is the presence of religion in public life . Since
nationalism is the most potent formula for gathering people, the government is
most nervous about the linkage between nationalism and religion. In Yugoslavia,
religicin, indeed, tends to be national, which means that due to n ationalism one
cannot love one's enemy as one's own group . If there were Christian solidarity
in Yugoslavia, then the party would face a serious rival, but this is not the case.

•5"Catholicism and Politics," pp. 271-272.
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Structurally, the Communist Party holds the nationalities of Yugoslavia together
in a precarious balance.46
A similar assessment was made by Martin Hovan, a Methodist minister from
Novi Sad. He stated that respect for religious rights has definitively improved
since the middle l 960's. The government does not interfere in internal matters
of the church, though it does sometimes request infonnation about what is going
on. The government completely accepts the internal regulations of churches and
regards those church people who break such rules as having made an error. The
officials are infonned and may even give church leaders legal advice, but they do
not step in to settle an issue (a specific problem in the Skopje Methodi,st Church
was cited as an example). The laws disallow to churches anything that is not
strictly religious (such as sports, recreation, dances, excursions, etc.), but the
religious press is free . There is no prior censorship. One copy of each published
issue must be submitted to the justice department, and the public prosecutor
may seek the b anning of distribution of a particular issue if the court agrees that
the material is objectionable. Importation of literature from abroad is more
problematic. Up to three copies can be received without problems, but a special
permit must be issued by the government for bulk shipments. When a bulk
shipment is sent witl10ut permission, the customs office notifies the respective
church that it cannot b e delivered for lack of permit.
According to Hovan, there is no excessive arbitrariness, but there are region
al differences. For instance, in Macedonia there is less objection about an educa
tor who goes to church than in Serbia. In Slovenia and Croatia the oyerall situa
tion is better than in Serbia. If there are problems, the churches relate to the
Commission for Relations with Religious Communities on the federal, state,
provincial, or municipal levels.47

VIL Conclusion
The responsibility for the conflicts and ambiguities of the Yugoslav situation
with regard to religiou s liberties rests not only on the government; the churches
themselves have frequently initiated or contributed to the tension. To proclaim
religious liberty and human rights when until very recently the same institution
denied it to others and still shows disrespect for the rights even of some of its
own members sounds hollow and hypocritical . The past behavior or misbehavior
of many of the religiou s communities is one of the serious obstacles to a success
ful affirmation of such rights today. The very narrow scope of the present reli
gious concern for human rights weakens the effectiveness of any church's wit
ness. The Yugoslav churches have not shown any great creativeness in broaden
ing the notion of religious liberty. The link with nationalism gives some of the
46Interview with Dr. Vjekoslav Bajsi� in Zagreb , Yugoslavia, A ugust 2 , 1985.
47.lnterview with the Rev. Martin Hovan in Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, August 6, 198_5.
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chUrches the clout to defend their own minimal rights, and, regretfully , most
have been satisfied to continue to travel this same route. They seem to feel that
an ever greater claim of being the defender of a certain nationalism will increase
their freedom and influence, possibly to the position of a favorite status. Very
few churches have sought to find in their own religious treasure some creative
responses or initiatives which would not at the same time threaten the liberties
of other churches. As long as the government continues to be the sole guarantor
of at least legal equality among the religious groups, the churches will be ineffec
tive as authentic embodiments of the proclamation and practice of religious
liberties and human rights.
The main source of the denial of religious liberties, however, lies directly in
the attitude of the League of Communists, as implemented by the government.
While the League of Communists has considerably softened its original extremely
intolerant attitude, making the situation currently much more bearable, its pre
vailing view is still that religion does not belong to the socialist order. By one
means or another, religion is to be limited, isolated, marginalized , attacked, and
-in the long run-eliminated. As long as this persists, religious people will not
feel at home in their own country, and Communists will continue to suspect
them as an alien nuisance and threat. Only a minority of Marxist intellectuals
have worked at discovering a more conciliatory fonnula which would recognize
the right of religious people to full civil liberties; while their views have had some
impact, it cannot be said that they have been accepted by the power-wielders.
The precariousness of the present situation, frought with ambiguities and
pitfalls, reflects, at least for the time being, Yugoslavia's way of handling reli
gious liberties.
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